

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Christopher Odom, ) **C/A No. 2:10-2376-RMG-JRM**  
vs. )  
Plaintiff, )  
vs. ) **Report and Recommendation**  
Belk, Cobb, Infinger, & Goldstein, PA; )  
Julie Armstrong, )  
Defendants. )

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*Background of this Case*

The *pro se* plaintiff is a resident of Charleston, South Carolina. He is a former inmate of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The plaintiff has brought suit against a law firm and the Clerk of Court for Charleston County. The caption and “STATEMENT OF CLAIM” portions of the complaint reveal that the above-captioned case is an action for defamation and fraud. The plaintiff alleges that the law firm has defamed him by making false statements in connection with a pending case in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County. The case is Case No. 2010-CP-10-1409, which, according to the plaintiff is a “PCR” case concerning a municipal court conviction.<sup>1</sup> The Public Index for the Charleston County Clerk of Court website

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<sup>1</sup>Litigants may use the post-conviction process for a conviction entered in a municipal court or in a county magistrate’s court. *Talley v. State*, 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878 (2007).

reveals that the case, which was filed on February 19, 2010, is pending. The plaintiff also appears to be alleging that defendant Armstrong has wrongfully consolidated two different PCR cases.<sup>2</sup> In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks \$500,000 in damages, a restraining order, a change of venue in his state court cases, and a right to amend his complaint.

### ***Discussion***

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* pleadings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The review<sup>3</sup> has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the district court's authority to conduct an initial screening of any *pro se* filing);<sup>4</sup> *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and *Gordon v. Leake*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. *See Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)(*per curiam*); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(*per curiam*); and *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S.

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<sup>2</sup>The plaintiff does not disclose the other PCR case, but the Public Index for the Charleston County Clerk of Court website lists a second PCR case, Case No. 2010-CP-10-1487, which was filed on February 22, 2010.

<sup>3</sup>Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (DSC), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

<sup>4</sup>*Boyce* has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (insofar as *Neitzke* establishes that a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit *sua sponte* dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as “frivolous”).

319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint or petition, the plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of New York*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). A litigant must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant or respondent is plausibly liable, not merely possibly liable. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Even under this less stringent standard, the complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Department of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition or complaint to include claims that were never presented, *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's or petitioner's legal arguments for him or her, *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

The Law Firm of Belk, Cobb, Infinger, and Goldstein is subject to summary dismissal because it has not acted under color of state law. In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant deprived him or her of a federal right, and (2) did so under color of state law. *See Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); *American Mfr. Mut.*

*Ins. Co. v. Sullivan*, 526 U.S. 40, 50-52 (1999); and *Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 & nn. 2-3 (4th Cir. 1980).<sup>5</sup>

The district court in *Hall v. Quillen* had disposed of the case against a physician and a court-appointed attorney on grounds of immunity. In affirming the district court's order, the Court of Appeals, however, indicated that lower courts should first determine whether state action occurred:

But immunity as a defense only becomes a relevant issue in a case such as this if the court has already determined affirmatively that the action of the defendant represented state action. This is so because state action is an essential preliminary condition to § 1983 jurisdiction, and a failure to find state action disposes of such an action adversely to the plaintiff.

*Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d at 1155 (citations omitted). *See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement . . . also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").

Although a private individual or corporation can act under color of state law, his, her, or its actions must occur where the private individual or corporation is a willful participant in joint action with the State or with an agent of the State. *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, is not actionable

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<sup>5</sup>An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Deas v. Potts*, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (private attorney); *Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d at 1155-56 & nn. 2-3 (court-appointed attorney); and *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 & nn. 8-16 (1981) (public defender).

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. at 936; and *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).<sup>6</sup>

Whether a private individual's action or corporation's action rises to the level of state action necessarily depends on the relationship between the activity and the state. The inquiry involves "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action . . . so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." *Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.*, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). In *Blum v. Yaretsky*, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a state is responsible for private action only when it has exercised "coercive power" or has provided "significant encouragement" in the implementation of the action. It is also well settled that "a private person does not act under color of state law simply because he invokes state authority." *Brummett v. Camble*, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991). *See also Auster Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. Stream*, 764 F.2d 381, 388 (5th Cir. 1985); *American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan*, 526 U.S. at 50-52 (held: private insurer did not act under color of state law, for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when it terminated payment of workers compensation benefits pending review); and *cf. Kreschollek v. Southern Stevedoring Co.*, 223 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 2000) (applying holding in *Sullivan* to suit alleging action under color of federal law: termination of LHWCA [Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act] benefits by insurance company did not involve "federal government" action). *Cf. Fleming v. Asbill*, 42 F.3d 886, 890 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Private lawyers do not act 'under color of state law' merely by making use of the state's court system").

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<sup>6</sup>*Burton* involved the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts have uniformly held that conduct which constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment also constitutes action under color of state law, insofar as suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are concerned. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988) (collecting cases).

Julie Armstrong, the Clerk of Court for Charleston County, is entitled to summary dismissal because of quasi judicial immunity. *See Cook v. Smith*, 812 F. Supp. 561, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1993); and *Mourat v. Common Pleas Court of Lehigh County*, 515 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In *Mourat v. Common Pleas Court of Lehigh County*, the district court, in a ruling from the bench, commented:

The clerk, Joseph Joseph, is also immune from suit. In the "recognized immunity enjoyed by judicial and quasi-judicial officers, including prothonotaries, there exists an equally well-grounded principle that any public official acting pursuant to court order is also immune." We have here quoted from *Lockhart v. Hoenstine*, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969). If he failed to act in accordance with the judicial mandate or court rule, he would place himself in contempt of court. See *Zimmerman v. Spears*, 428 F. Supp. 759, 752 (W.D.Tex.), *aff'd*, 565 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); *Davis v. Quarter Sessions Court*, 361 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D.Pa.1973); *Ginsburg v. Stern*, 125 F. Supp. 596 (W.D.Pa.1954), *aff'd per curiam on other grounds*, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955) sitting en banc.

*Mourat v. Common Pleas Court for Lehigh County*, 515 F. Supp. at 1076. *See also Dieu v. Norton*, 411 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969) ("Defendants Circuit Judge Cotton, court reporter Tellschow and circuit court clerk Block were all acting in the discharge of their official responsibilities[;][a]s such they were protected by the traditional doctrine of judicial immunity, as this rule of law was not abolished by § 1983, *supra*.").

The doctrine of absolute quasi judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court support personnel because of "the 'danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts[.]" *Kincaid v. Vail*, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992), quoting *Scruggs*

*v. Moellering*, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989).<sup>7</sup> See also *Ashbrook v. Hoffman*, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980) (collecting cases on immunity of court support personnel); *Pink v. Lester*, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995); and *Mayes v. Wheaton*, No. 97 C 8072, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17182, 1999 WL 1000510 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 1, 1999) (“Judicial immunity extends to all persons performing judicial and quasi-judicial functions, as well as those acting under the orders, or at the discretion, of a judicial officer.”), citing *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988).

In this civil action, the plaintiff cannot obtain damages for defamation. An alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn. 3-4 (1976). Secondly, under longstanding South Carolina case law, contents of governmental records – such as judicial proceedings, case reports, published cases, investigative reports, or arrest records – do not give rise to liability for slander or libel. See *Heyward v. Cuthbert*, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 354, 356-359 (1827); and *Padgett v. Sun News*, 278 S.C. 26, 292 S.E.2d 30, 32-33 (1982). See also case law interpreting the "fair report" doctrine (press may publish a "fair report" on official government proceedings such as arrest records, court records, or transcripts, even if the contents of those governmental records are defamatory), such as, e.g., *Medico v. Time, Inc.*, 643 F.2d 134, 137-140 (3rd Cir. 1981), where the Court held that a news magazine was privileged to publish a summary of FBI documents identifying the appellant as a member of an organized crime group; *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (prohibiting invasion of privacy action for publication of public record – name of deceased rape

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<sup>7</sup>Insofar as court reporters in federal criminal trials are concerned, the holding in *Scruggs v. Moellering*, which granted absolute immunity to court reporters, is not applicable. See *Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.*, 508 U.S. 429 (1993) (resolving inter-circuit conflict between circuits holding that court reporters in federal criminal trials have absolute immunity and circuits holding that court reporters in federal criminal trials have qualified immunity).

victim); and *Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo*, 849 F.2d 876, 878-80 & nn. 1-2 (4th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, do not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under a state's tort law. *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services*, 489 U.S. 189, 200-203 (1989).

A state law cause of action would be cognizable in this federal court under the diversity statute, if that statute's requirements are satisfied. *Cianbro Corporation v. Jeffcoat and Martin*, 804 F. Supp. 784, 788-791 (D.S.C. 1992), *affirmed*, *Cianbro Corporation v. Jeffcoat and Martin*, No. 92-2368, 10 F.3d 806 [Table], 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 30080, 1993 WL 478836 (4th Cir., Nov. 22, 1993). The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars (\$75,000.00):

- (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
  - (1) citizens of different States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1332. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side. *See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger*, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). Since the plaintiff and both defendants are citizens of South Carolina, complete diversity of parties is not present in this case. *Strawbridge v. Curtiss*, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>The diversity statute provides that a corporation is a citizen of the state of its incorporation and of the state in which it has its principal place of business:

- (c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title—
  - (1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by

(continued...)

This federal court cannot order the Clerk of Court for Charleston County to grant changes of venues in the plaintiff's state court cases. *See Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County*, 411 F.2d 586, 587-588 & nn. 2-4 (4th Cir. 1969). Also, under the new standard adopted by our Court of Appeals, the plaintiff is not entitled to a temporary restraining order. *See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission*, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), *cert. granted and judgment vacated by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission*, 176 L.Ed.2d 764, 130 S.Ct. 2371 (2010), *adhered to, in part, by The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC*, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010)(*per curiam*), which has superannuated older cases, such as *Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seelig*, 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1977); and *Airport Comm. of Forsyth Co., N.C. v. Civil Aeronautics Board*, 296 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1961)(*per curiam*).

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(...continued)

which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business, except that in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business; and

(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or incompetent.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). Information contained on the South Carolina Secretary of State database (available on the LEXIS service) reveals that Belk, Cobb, Infinger, and Goldstein, P.A., is a domestic corporation incorporated on April 23, 1990. Hence, the Law Firm of Belk, Cobb, Infinger, and Goldstein is a citizen of South Carolina because it is incorporated in South Carolina and has its principal place of business in South Carolina. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).



***Recommendation***

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court summarily dismiss the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and *Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp.*, 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“District courts . . . are . . . capable of determining when an action is frivolous. Indeed, as courts of first instance, district courts are especially likely to be exposed to frivolous actions, and thus have an even greater need for inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources.”). The plaintiff’s attention is directed to the important Notice on the next page.



September 23, 2010  
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph R. McCrorey  
United States Magistrate Judge

### **Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The plaintiff is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. **Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court  
United States District Court  
901 Richland Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201**

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).